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Iran-US Claims Tribunal, McCollough & Company, Inc. v. Ministry Of Post, Telegraph and Telephone, 11 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R., at 3 et seq.

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Table of Contents

MCCOLLOUGH & COMPANY, INC., Claimant v. THE MINISTRY OF POST, TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE, THE NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY and BANK MARKAZI, RespondentsAWARDI. INTRODUCTORY ISSUESIII. THE CLAIMS AGAINST THE RESPONDENT PTTThe Factual BackgroundThe MeritsVII. INTERESTCONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE BROWERIII. CURRENCY OF THE AWARD, INTEREST AND COSTSA. Currency of the AwardB. Interest

Content

3

MCCOLLOUGH & COMPANY, INC., Claimant v. THE MINISTRY OF POST, TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE, THE NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY and BANK MARKAZI, Respondents

(Case No. 89)

Chamber Three: Virally, Chairman; Brower,1 Ansari,2 Members

Signed 22 April 19863

AWARD NO. 225-89-3

The following is the text as issued by the Tribunal:

APPEARANCES

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4

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AWARD

I. INTRODUCTORY ISSUES

1. The Claimant in the present Case, McCollough & Company Inc. ("McCollough"), submitted its Statement of Claim on 17 November 1981. McCollough raised claims against three Respondents, the Ministry of Post, Telegraph and Telephone ("PTT"), the National Iranian Oil Company ("NIOC") and Bank Markazi. The claims are based on certain contracts for consultancy services to be provided by McCollough in Iran. Substantial counterclaims were raised by PTT and NIOC, arising out of the Claimant's activities in Iran.

2. At the time of filing the Statement of Claim, the claims against the Respondent PTT were received and accepted for filing. The claims against the Respondents NIOC and Bank Markazi were initially not filed but "lodged" with the Tribunal on the ground that they were claims in amounts below US $250,000. At its 24th Meeting, on 18 December 1981, the Full Tribunal decided to accept the filing of aggregated claims as one case.4 Following a requested amendment, the claims against the Respondent PTT were "aggregated" with. the claims against the Respondents NIOC and Bank Markazi into one case, the present Case, thereby rendering all claims submitted by McCollough acceptable for filing.

3. The Parties submitted extensive Memorials on all issues of the Case. A Pre-Hearing Conference was held on 2 May 1984.

4. At the Pre-Hearing Conference the Claimant indicated that it wished to withdraw its claim against Bank Markazi. Bank Markazi filed a further Statement of Interest on 7 February 1985 requesting "the Tribunal to render an award rejecting Claimant's Statement of Claim . . . and compelling Claimant to pay all related damages".

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6

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III. THE CLAIMS AGAINST THE RESPONDENT PTT

The Factual Background

11. In 1969 the Government of Iran decided to develop and establish a comprehensive domestic telecommunications system providing telephone, telegraph, television and telex services through the use of microwave communication systems. This system became known as the Integrated National Telecommunications System ("INTS"). The Services of an international consortium of telecommunications contractors were procured to implement this decision. The consortium was comprised of General Telephone and Electronics International, Inc., Nippon Electric Company Limited, Page Communication Engineers Inc. and Siemens A.G. ("GNPS Consortium"). Due to the scope of the project it was decided to set up a "separate semi-autonomous Program Management Organization" ("PMO") to supervise the GNPS Consortium's activities and performance and that the PMO would avail itself of the assistance of a telecommunications consultant. Negotiations were undertaken with McCollough as the prospective consultant and on 7 October 1970 P7T and McCollough signed a contract ("Contract"). Under the Contract 7 McCollough agreed to "plan, monitor, coordinate, and manage the development of Iran's Integrated National Telecommunications System". The Contract was subsequently amended, supplemented or extended on seven different occasions, and on 4 February 1979 the Parties executed a "Procès Verbal", according to which, inter alia, the Contract was suspended. On 21 March 1979 the Contract expired by its own terms.

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11

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The Merits

27. The Claimant seeks payment for invoices for services performed under the Contract, the return of funds retained under the Contract "as guarantee for good performance of the work", compensation for certain services performed in relation to the Contract, as well as interest and its costs of arbitration. In addition the Claimant seeks payment of the rial amount due in dollars at a conversion rate of 70.35 rials/dollar, i.e., the rate allegedly applicable at the time of suspension and expiration of the Contract. The issues of interest, costs and currency of payment are dealt with subsequently in this Award.

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26

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VII. INTEREST

88. The Claimant seeks 12% simple interest per annum until February 1979 on the invoice claims against the Respondent PTT, and thereafter, 15% interest compounded annually an outstanding indebtedness. On the claims against the Respondent NIOC the Claimant seeks interest calculated at a rate of 10% simple interest per annum.

89. The Respondent objects to the payment of any interest at all, contending that according to the choice of law provisions contained in the contracts Iranian law is applicable, and that according to Iranian law interest is not payable on the indebtedness here at issue.

90. Like any other decisions of the Tribunal, a decision to award interest must be made on the basis of respect for law, and in this field as in any other, the applicable law is to be determined by the Tribunal in accordance with the guidelines contained in Article V of the Claims Settlement Declaration.

91. In determining the applicable law in this field the Tribunal 27 must rely on the practice followed by relevant judicial institutions. The task of determining the applicable law is, however, a difficult one due to the uncertainties and contradictions which can be observed both in different domestic legal systems and in international law, as well as in trade usages.

92. In most, if not all, legal systems, when interest is awarded as an element of compensation for damage incurred due to a breach of contract, the applicable rates of interest are determined by reference to statutory rates, unless there are particular circumstances. The rates thus determined are of a great variety in various legal systems, however. The same variety appears in the determination of the date from which interest is awarded. Depending on the legal system in question and the circumstances, this date can be either the date on which the damage occurred, the date of a formal notice to pay, the date of the court judgment, or still another date. This variety is particularly well illustrated by the fact that since the Islamic Revolution, Iranian law, like the law in other countries applying Islamic principles, prohibits the award of any interest, whereas in the American legal system interest is usually awarded, and, although the rates vary quite considerably depending on the applicable statute, the trend appears to be towards the application of rates comparable to commercial rates of interest.

93. The practice of international tribunals demonstrates perhaps an even greater variety in this respect. The international awards which do not allocate interest or which fix very low rates are rather dated or concern non-commercial disputes between governments. For these reasons they have a limited authority. In any event it is noteworthy that no general rule can be derived from them. The often quoted judgment of the Permanent Court of International justice in the Wimbledon Case,14 which awarded interest only from the date of the judgment at a "fair" rate of 6%, having regard to the conditions then prevailing for public loans, did not purport to establish such a

94. As to more recent practice, in cases between governments (or their instrumentalities or agencies) and foreign corporations directly submitted by the parties to transnational arbitration by international tribunals, or referred to arbitration through diplomatic protection, a large variety of rates of interest have been awarded. A few examples from among the best known awards show rates 28 varying from 5 or 6%15 to 14 1/2%16 through 71/2%,17 8% ,18 9%,19 10%,20 and 12%.21

95. The same diversity appears in relation to the date from which interest is calculated. In some cases, the starting point is fixed at the time when the awarded amounts were due, or, at least, in direct relation with the time when the damage occurred.22 In yet other cases, the date of the award or of its notification,23 or a specific date after the award, is determinative.24 A few awards make reference to the law recognized as applicable to the contract which is the subject matter of the case.25 Other cases do not refer to any particular system of law or expressly cite the discretion of the arbitrator.26

96. Most awards allocate only simple interest, but occasionally compound interest has been awarded27 and sometimes a percentage is added to the interest in consideration of the rate of inflation.28

97. It is difficult to draw any distinct conclusions from so diverse a practice. The Tribunal can conclude, however, that no uniform rule of law relating to interest has emerged from the practice in transnational arbitration, in contrast to the well developed rules regarding the determination of the standard of compensation for 29 damages resulting from a breach of contract, where the rule of full compensation usually is applied. No comparable rule has taken form governing the rate of interest or the time from which interest is to be computed. This is illustrated by the frequent use of the word "fair" to qualify the rate chosen, or by the equally frequent references to the "discretion of the arbitrator". The absence of a uniform rule does not, however, imply the absence of general principles. On the contrary, two principles or guidelines, of general import, albeit of delicate implementation, can be deduced from the international practice briefly described above.

98. The first principle is that under normal circumstances, and especially in commercial cases, interest is allocated on the amounts awarded as damages in order to compensate for the delay with which the - payment to the successful party is made. This delay, however, varies in relation to the date determined to be the time when the obligation to pay arose. This date can be the date when the underlying damage occurred, the date when the debt was liquidated, the date of a formal notice to pay, the date of the beginning of the arbitral or judicial proceedings, the date of the award or of the judgment determining the amount due, or the date when the judicial or arbitral decision reasonably should have been executed.

99. The second principle is that the rate of interest must be reasonable, taking due account of all pertinent circumstances, which the Tribunal is entitled to consider by virtue of the discretion it is empowered to exercise in this field.

100. The circumstances to take into consideration in view of determining a "reasonable", or "fair" rate, which would award to the successful party an appropriate compensation without submitting the losing party to an excessive burden, are many and, in fact, unlimited. Given their number, their complexity, the necessity of attributing to each the relative weight it deserves, international or transnational Tribunals usually decline to list them in each case, presumably in order to avoid overly lengthy explanations. Still referring to the scarce guidance given by the practice, it is possible to cite among them: (i) any pertinent contractual stipulations (which, when they exist, are usually followed for the determination of the rates); (ii) the rules and principles of the law applicable to the contract; (iii) the nature of the facts generating the damage; (iv) the nature or level of the compensation awarded, particularly if it extends to the lost profit or includes a profit in the costs to be reimbursed; (v) the knowledge that the defaulting party could have had of the financial consequences of 30 its default for the other party; (vi) the rates in effect on the markets concerned; and (vii) the rates of inflation, etc.

101. These two principles, drawn from the international practice, are principles of commercial and international law, within the meaning of Article V of the Claims Settlement Declaration. By virtue of the nature of the arbitral tribunals which apply them and of the cases involved, they qualify as general usages of trade. They are particularly relevant to this Tribunal.

102. The Tribunal must, however, in the implementation of these principles, take into account its own specific features. Undoubtedly, the most important of these is the fact that it was set up by international treaty, from which it derives a jurisdiction extending actually to a great number of cases, and not by a contractual stipulation, as is usual for transnational tribunals established for the settlement of commercial disputes. Consequently, as noted earlier, the law to be applied must be determined by the Tribunal in conformity with the terms of Article V of the Claims Settlement Declaration. Besides, with the present composition of the Tribunal, the delay between the initial statement of claim and the notification of the corresponding award may be rather lengthy, in many cases exceeding the usual delays in international arbitration or domestic litigation. By contrast no delay and no procedure is needed for the execution of the awards rendered in favor of United States nationals, who benefit from the full guarantee of execution resulting from the Security Account established under paragraph 7 of the General Declaration.

103. So far, the principles enunciated above have actually been applied by the Tribunal, which usually has fixed a moderate rate, labelled as "fair", or "reasonable", and, in somecases, supported by express reference to the discretion of the arbitrator.29 In the exercise 31 of this discretion recognised by international law, the Chambers have not always reached identical results, as was noticed in the Sylvania Award.30 To the extent that the diversity of rates applied by the different Chambers is not traceable to the varying circumstances of each case, a higher degree of uniformity is certainly desirable. On the other hand, the diversity of the cases submitted to the Tribunal renders difficult the application of an inflexibly determined interest rate in all cases. For the same reason, the date from which the interest will be calculated is best determined on a case by case approach, taking due account of all relevant factors.

104. As to the determination of the applicable rate of interest to be awarded in the present Case, the Tribunal initially notes that the Claimant has not submitted any specific reasons for the higher rate of interest claimed against the Respondent PTT. The Tribunal has further taken into account that at issue in this Case are ordinary contracts of a commercialnature, governed by Iranian law, without any provisions for applicable rates of interest in case of delayed payments, and that the breaches of contract at issue relate largely to non-payment of invoices. On the basis of the foregoing the Tribunal determines that a fair rate of interest to be awarded on all the amounts determined to be due and owing to the Claimant is 10% per annum. As to the Contract between PTT and the Claimant, interest shall be calculated from the date of the expiry of the Contract, i.e., 21 March 1979, on all the amounts due with the exception of the amount of US $40,499, due under Invoice No. MAC-PTT-4-83, where interest shall be calculated from the date of its submission, i.e., 18 July 1984. As to the NIOC Contract, interest shall be calculated from the date of the suspension of the NIOC Contract, i.e., 19 October 1979.

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CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE BROWER

1. I largely concur in this Award, both because it reaches a broadly just monetary result and because such concurrence is indispensable to the formation of a majority. I am constrained to observe, however, that on every issue of fundamental principle - i.e., interest, currency of the Award, jurisdiction in respect of tax and social security counterclaims, analysis of forum selection clauses, and, to a certain extent, costs - the Award stubbornly refuses to follow the clean precedents and established practices of the Tribunal. Instead, it invariably selects a different route, and, moreover, one leading to proliferation of the Tribunals tasks in each future case rather than their rational diminution. Since this is the first contested Award issued by this Chamber in its present composition, I feel an elaboration of my concerns to be especially appropriate.

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40

III. CURRENCY OF THE AWARD, INTEREST AND COSTS

A. Currency of the Award

15. I agree that the Award here must be paid entirely in United States dollars. I disagree most strenuously, however, with the Award insofar as, contrary to the unbroken line of precedents of this Tribunal since its establishment five years ago,9 it states certain sums as awarded in Iranian rials.

16. The hitherto consistent practice of the Tribunal to issue all contested awards in dollars,10 after converting any sum otherwise contractually due in rials at the rate applicable on the date of breach, conforms both with international precedents and with reason.

17. When payment is required in a currency different than that foreseen by a contract, as indeed it must be here, the only question is of the rate at which the necessary conversion should be made. In determining the appropriate rate, the following principles are applied:

The objective of civil money judgments is, in general, to place the judgment creditor (i.e., the injured party) in a position as close as possible to that in which he would have been if the obligation had been carried out by the judgment debtor or if the injury had not occurred. When obligations are incurred in currencies other than the currency of the forum [payment], the same objectives govern. Neither party should receive a windfall nor be penalized as a result of currency conversion . . . . Unless the interests of justice require a different result, if the foreign currency has depreciated since the injury or breach, judgment should be given at the rate of exchange applicable on the date of injury or breach . . .

Restatement of the Law, Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised) (Tentative Final Draft, 15 July 1985) §823, Comment, c. Heretofore this rule has been followed by the Tribunal without exception, recognizing further (1) that an American claimant's agreement to accept rials in the first place most likely was a 41 recognition that performance of the contract would entail expenditures in local currency; (2) that after his contract is breached or otherwise ended the claimant ordinarily no longer has any use for rials; (3) that in most cases he himself has been required to exchange dollars for rials in order to meet his local expenses in the absence of timely payment by the Iranian party; and therefore (4) that had he in fact been paid in rials at the termination of the contract, he inevitably would have converted them to repatriable dollars.

18. The Award substitutes a convoluted scheme apparently designed to produce substantially the same dollar result as the conventional method while theoretically preserving intact the contract terms. The result, however, is simply to complicate the adjudicatory process, while departing just as surely - indeed more so - from the original contract terms. Nowhere do the contracts here in issue themselves foresee a 12.5% increase in the rials payable under them; that supplement results entirely from the application of principles of equity extraneous to the contracts themselves. To expand the number of rials to be paid beyond those called for by the contracts, rather than applying principles of equity to a sum derived directly from the contracts, does more, not less, violence to the contracts. In the end, nothing more than illusion and confusion are achieved by the "Rube Golderg contraption" of increasing the number of rials payable to a level that, when converted at the present exchange rate, produces substantially the same result as if the contractually prescribed rial payment were converted at the time of breach.

19. An additional vice of this formula is that, as applied, it does not even produce "substantially" the correct result. The contractually required rials are increased only by 12.5% to adjust for rial depreciation of 14.44% (from an average of 70.52/$1 to 80.7/$1). A difference of 1.94% in some cases, however, is the margin between profit and loss.

20. The Tribunals error is compounded by the failure to grant interest in respect of the "adjustment" amount. Without any analysis of the matter whatsoever, the Award simply restricts interest to the contractually prescribed rial sum. As approximately seven years' interest is allowed by the Award in general, at 10% per annum, this means that a sum equal to about 70% of the 12.5% adjustment is withheld from Claimant unjustifiably. Indeed, the effect of the scheme adopted here, including the deprivation of interest, is to grant Claimant approximately 6% less than it would receive in respect of rial debts were the traditional formula applied 42 and interest of 10% per annum calculated across the board.11 There is no reason in justice for such a "windfall" to Respondents and none has been ventured.

21. I dissent from adoption of a wholly novel and unduly cumbersome scheme which precedent does not support, reason does not recommend and justice therefore should not abide.

B. Interest

22. The Award studiously declines to embrace the rule adopted initially by Chamber One in Sylvania Technical Systems, Inc. v. Iran, Award No. 180-64-1 at 30-3412 (27 June 1985) and to which Chamber Two now has adhered sub silentio in Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Iran, Award No. 217-99-213 (19 March 1986) and Phelps Dodge International Corp. v. Iran, Award No. 218-135-214 (19 March 1986). I regret that the Tribunal thereby is prevented from acting uniformly in the matter of interest as I would have preferred. See International Technical Products Corporation v. Iran, Award No. 196-302-3 at 50 n. 2515 (28 Oct. 1985); id., Award No. 186-302-3 at 51 n. 1516 (19 Aug. 1985); Futura Trading Incorporated v. Khuzestan Water and Power Authority, Award No. 187-325-3 at 20 n. 817 (19 Aug. 1985).

23. In order to form a majority on this point now and in the future I am persuaded nonetheless to concur. I do so confident that the result is just, however imperfectly so.

24. Conceptually, interest is an item of damage. Its award is intended as compensation for the temporary withholding of money, and its measure is the cost of such deprivation. In a perfect world such measure would be the actual cost to the injured creditor of replacing it, i.e., the interest paid for borrowing substitute funds, or the earnings lost due to its unavailability, i.e. , the return on such sums had they been received and reinvested.

43

25. Two factors, however, unite against realization of such a perfect world. First, due to circumstances unforeseeable to the debtor, the creditor's cost of borrowing, or even his rate of return an investment, might be unusually high; the ordinary rule shielding a wrongdoer from the assessment of damages not reasonably foreseeable precludes the creditor, as in other situations, from recovering his true loss. Second, the evidentiary complexity of substantiating "interest damages", which by definition is an essentially ancillary process ordinarily directed at establishing but a fraction of the overall loss, may render the effort involved, for litigants and judges alike, disproportionate to the result. In short, the game may not be worth the candle. Thus the struggle for perfection, as so often, must be tempered by competing considerations, both of right and of practicality.

26. A Tribunal such as this one lives with the additional reality of a finite docket of cases, all fixed as of a certain date, with attendant consequences: (1) Each case competes with every other for consideration; and (2) each succeeding award, because decided at a date further removed from the events giving rise to the entire docket, will have a higher percentage component of interest. As a result an enormous emphasis must be placed on the administrative convenience afforded by a rule or formula for interest which provides a result with comparative automaticity.

27. In light of all these considerations it is small wonder that international tribunals, as the Award demonstrates, furnish precedents for almost any decision one might wish to make in regard to interest. Against this background it is difficult to argue that the result reached by the Award is unreasonable. While, as noted, I believe the work of the Tribunal would have been facilitated by this Chamber joining in adherence to the fair standard already established, I recognize that the application of a flat rate of interest of 10%, if not varied, would have the advantage of even more complete automaticity and is not presently unjust.

28. For these reasons I now concur, in the absence of a contractually prescribed interest rate or similarly overriding circumstances, in applying ordinarily a flat interest rate of 10% per annum.

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1Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, see p. 35 below.
2Separate Opinion, see p. 45 below.
3Filed 22 April 1986.
4See Ford Aerospace & Communication Corp. v. The Air Force of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Interim Award No. 39-159-3 at 10 [6 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 104 at 109] (4 June 1984). In this Award the Tribunal further specified that "aggregation" of claims "concerns the propriety of the claims [ . . . ] being heard in a consolidated fashion rather than separately, and does not address the jurisdiction of the Tribunal per se".
14P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 1, at 32 (1923).
15Libyan American Oil Co. (LIAMCO) v. The Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, 20 Int'l Legal Mat'ls 82-83 (1981); Amco Asia Corp. v. Indonesia, 24 Int'1 Legal Mat'ls 1038 (1985); Revere Copper and Brass, Inc. v. Overseas Private Investment Company, 17 Int'l Legal Mat'ls 1367 (1978); S.P.P. and others v. A. R. E. and Egyptian General Company for Tourism and Hotels, 22 Int'1 Legal Mat'ls 783 (1983).
16Stellar Chartering & Brokerage, Inc. Time-chartered owners of the M1V Continental Trader (USA) v. Rijn, Maas en Zee Scheepvaartkantoor, Charterers (Netherlands), VII Y.B. Commercial Arbitration 147 (1982).
17American Independent Oil Co. (Aminoil) v. Kuwait, 21 Int'1 Legal Mat'ls 1042 (1982).
18Mechema Ltd. (England) v. S.A. Mines, Minérais et Métaux (Belgium), VII Y.B. Commercial Arbitration 80 (1982); Société GTM v. East Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation, V Y.B. Commercial Arbitration 179 (1980).
19Norwegian Agent v. Belgian Shipowner, VIII Y.B. Commercial Arbitration 94 (1983).
20Ltd. Benvenuti et Bonfant slr v. The Government of the People's Republic of the Congo, 21 Int'1 Legal Mat'ls 762 (1982); Saudi Arabian Hotel Company v. Insurance Company of a European Country, X Y.B. Commercial Arbitration 41 (1985); A.B. Götaverken v. General Maritime Transport Company (GMTC), as legal successor of Libyan General Maritime Transport Organization (GMTO) (Libyan), V I Y. B. Commercial Arbitration 139 (1981).
21Stellar Chartering & Brokerage.
22Agip Co. v. The Government of the People's Republic of the Congo, 21 Int'l Legal Mat'ls 738-739 (1982); Benvenuti et Bonfant; Stellar Chartering and Brokerage.
23LIAMCO; A.B. Götaverken.
24Revere Copper and Brass; Mechema.
25Amco Asia Corp.; S.P.P. and others; LIAMCO; Saudi Arabian Hotel.
26LIAMCO; Revere Copper and Brass.
27Aminoil.
28Aminoil.
29Cf. Schering Corporation v. Iran, Award No. 122-38-3 at 12 (16 April 1984), reprinted in 5 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 361, 367; T.C.S.B. Inc. v. Iran, Award No. 114-140-2 at 16 (16 March 1984), reprinted in 5 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 160, 169; American International Group Inc. v. Iran, Award No. 93-2-3 at 22 (19 Dec. 1983), reprinted in 4 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 96, 110; Woodward-Clyde Consultants v. Iran, Award No. 73-67-3 at 19 (2 Sept. 1983), reprinted in 3 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 239, 251; John Carl Warnecke and Associates v. Bank Mellat, Award No. 72-124-3 at 22 (2 Sept. 1983), reprinted in 3 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 256, 267; Chas. T. Main International Inc. v. Mahab Consulting Engineers Inc., Award No. 70-185-3 at 10 (2 Sept. 1983), reprinted in 3 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 270, 275; Intrend International Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air Force, Award No. 59-220-2 at.13 (27 July 1983), reprinted in 3 IRAN-U.S C.T.R. 110, 117; Pomeroy Corp. v. Iran, Award No. 51-41-3 at 18 (8 June 1983), reprinted in 2 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 372, 385; Kimberly Clark Co. v. Iran, Award No. 46-57-2 at 16 (25 May 1983), reprinted in 2 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 334, 342; Granite State Machine Company v. Iran, Award No. 18-30-3 at 9 (15 Dec. 1982), reprinted in 1 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 442, 447.
30Sylvania Technical Systems, Inc. v. Iran, Award No. 180-64-1 at 30 (27 June 1985) [8 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 298 at 320].
9For the latest example see Blount Brothers Corp. v. Iran, Award No. 215-52-1 at 31-32 (6 March 1986) [10 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 56 at 78].
10The only Tribunal awards in currencies other than United States dollars were Awards an Agreed Terms. Hafez Glaziery and Glass Cutting Shop v. United States of America, Award No. 181-942-2 (8 July 1985) [8 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 349]; Cross Co. v. Iran, Award No. 174-320-1 (18 April 1985) [8 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 97]; Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co. v. Iran, Award No. 160-423-SC (22 Jan 1985) [8 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 15]; Stone and Webster Overseas Group Inc. v. National Petrochemical Company of Iran, Award No. 92-293-3 (19 Dec. 1983), reprinted in 4 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 192.
11To illustrate this, assume a 1,000,000 rial debt due seven years ago using 10% interest. Under the rules of the Tribunal heretofore the creditor would receive $24,106.63 (1,000,000 ÷ 70.52 = $14,180.37; .7 x $14,180.37 = $9,926.26; $14,180.37 + $9,926.62 = $24,106.63). Under the formula applied in this Award, however, the result is $22,614.63 (1,000,000 + (.7 x 1,000,000) = 1,700;000; 1,700,000 ÷ 80.7 = $21,065.68; 1,000,000 x .125 = 125,000; 125,000 ÷ 80.7 = $1,548.95; $21,065.68 + $1,548.95 = $22,614.63). The difference of $1,492 represents a 6.189% reduction.
128 IRAN-U.S. C.T:R. 298 at 320.
1310 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 121.
1410 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 157.
159 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 206 at 241 n. 38.
169 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 10 at 44 n. 24.
179 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 46 at 59 n. 11.

Referring Principles

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