156Galuska v. N.Y. Stock Exch., No. 99-3522, 2000 WL 347851, at *2 (7th Cir. Apr. 3, 2000); New England Cleaning Servs. v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 199 F.3d 542 (1st Cir. 1999); Olson v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 85 F.3d 381, 382 (8th Cir. 1996).
157See, e.g., Lundgren v. Freeman, 307 F.2d 104, 117 (9th Cir. 1962) ("If their decisions can thereafter be questioned in suits brought against them by either party...their decisions will be governed more by the fear of such suits than by their own unfettered judgment as to the merits of the matter they must decide.")
158See Arthur A. Chaykin, The Liabilities and Immunities of Mediators: A Hostile Environment for Model Legislation, 2 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 47, 77 (1986) ("The granting of an immunity is a matter of public policy that balances the social utility of the immunity against the social loss of being unable to attack the immune defendant."); see also Tamari v. Conrad, 552 F.2d 778, 781 (7th Cir. 1977) ("[I]ndividuals...cannot be expected to volunteer to arbitrate disputes if they can be caught up in [a lawsuit].").
159See generally Chaykin, supra note 158. No empirical study confirms the assumption that either arbitrators or arbitration provider institutions would refuse to participate in arbitration without immunity. Cf. New England Cleaning Servs., 199 F.3d at 546 ("Failure to extend immunity to the AAA in these circumstances could discourage it from sponsoring future arbitrations.") This concern seemingly also applies to many other skilled and noble professionals, such as doctors and lawyers, who nonetheless are not immune from liability by law or contract.