‘An agreement to arbitrate before a specified tribunal is, in effect, a specialized kind of forum-selection clause. … The invalidation of such an agreement … would not only allow the respondent to repudiate its solemn promise but would, as well, reflect a parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our courts.’118
'… the construction of an arbitration clause should start from the assumption that the parties, as rational businessmen, are likely to have intended any dispute arising out of the relationship into which they have entered or purported to enter to be decided by the same tribunal. The clause should be construed in accordance with this presumption unless the language makes it clear that certain questions were intended to be excluded from the arbitrator's jurisdiction.'119
'The arbitrators have from the [arbitration] clause and the pleadings of the parties decided that both parties desire a settlement of disputes outside state jurisdiction. That wish, expressed by both parties, has essentially determined the attitude of the arbitrators vis-à-vis the clause inserted into the contract. They felt an obligation to help the parties realize such a wish.'123
113See BGH, NJW (2002), 1651, 1653 for the interpretation of conflicting standard forms in a contract that is subject to the CISG.
114See Decision on Jurisdiction, Amco Asia Corp. et al. v. Republic of Indonesia, ILM (1984), 351, 359 et seq.: ‘…any convention, including conventions to arbitrate, should be construed in good faith, that is to say by taking into account the consequences of their commitments the parties may be considered as having reasonably and legitimately envisaged’.
115Redfern and Hunter, Law and Practice, No. 3-38; Craig, Park, Paulsson, ICC Arbitration, 43; Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 230 et seq.
116Kaplan v. First Options of Chicago, Inc., 19 F.3d 1503, 1512 (3rd Cir. 1994); see also Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
117Born, supra note 114, 1326, stating that ‘…this type of presumption provides that a valid arbitration clause should generally be interpreted expansively and, in cases of doubt, extended to encompass disputed claims.’
118Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974).
119Fiona Trust & Holding Corp v. Privalov, [2007] UKHL 40.
120Paulsson, The Idea of Arbitration, 300: 'If we take this aspiration [to fulfil the very idea of arbitration as the binding resolution of disputes] as fundamental to the way we view, nurture, and control arbitration, it also appears to have a corollary. It is a simple principle, suggested as a lodestar for other social institutions, such as courts and legislatures, in their interaction with arbitrators: consensual arrangements for the resolution of disputes should be presumed valid …'.
121Lew, Mistelis, Kröll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, No. 7-61 with reference to the 'pro-arbitration bias' expressed in such landmark decisions as Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
122See Berger, International Economic Arbitration, 126 et seq.; see also Tennessee Imports, Inc. v. P.P. Filippi & Prix Italia, 745 F. Supp. 1314, 1326 (M.D. Tenn. 1990), stating that: 'The ICC Arbitration Court is,…, a well-recognized and highly-regarded arbitral institution specializing in the field of international commercial disputes.…There is little doubt that the ICC Arbitration Court can offer Tennessee Imports an effective forum'.
123Yugoslav Co. v. PDR Korea Co., Arbitration Court attached to the Chamber for Foreign Trade of the GDR, YCA (1983), 129, 131 (emphasis added).