1[...] My point in this book is to attempt a re-conception of both the function and the purpose of good faith in transnational law. What I will argue in the follow- ing pages is that good faith is best understood as a distinctly legal bridge to translate between deeply diverse interests, values, and perspectives. By bridging these interests, values, and perspectives, good faith in transnational law manages to stabilize transactions in a global marketplace despite the fact that participants in these transactions may not otherwise share much of a common culture, experience, or background. Good faith stabilizes these transactions by giving the parties continuous reasons to communicate with each other. Good faith provides a rough yardstick for such communication: other regard. This other regard requires parties to internalize and respond effectively to the reliance interests they have created in each other. [...] 111
The fundamental premise of this book is that good faith is an essential norm for transnational law to function. The argument I advance in this book is that good faith is not only descriptively a core part of transnational law, but that it is essential to its functioning as a theoretical matter. Before proposing a comparative legal defense of good faith as communicative other regard, it is therefore important to ask a somewhat basic question: why is transnational law better off with good faith in it? After all, there are jurisdictions that can do without good faith. Why should transnational law not emulate their example? [...]